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ABSTRACT: Economic agency as a matter of rational decision-making and 
as a problem of bounded rationality has never gone too far from its earlier 
formalization in the 1950s. Not that the advancement on this topic is so 
slow, but the same problem concerning higher level cognition as another 
general program of cognitive science is not as easy as behavioral studies. This 
paper will show a parallelism between economic agency and folk-
psychological perspective, and in turn will give a short description on how 
folk psychology is unseparable from modularity theory. In short, then there 
must be a way to cope with cognition as the black box of economics if we 
can identify the appropriate level of description of cognitive structure, i.e.: 
modularity theory. 
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"But the distance is so great between our present psychological 
knowledge of the learning and choice processes and the kinds of 




Cognition, devoted as the black box of economics (Arthur, 2000) recently has earned more  spaces 
to make more ‘realistic’ economic agent and agency. Rabin (2002) indicates an agitation from 
psychological perspective to make mainstream economics psychologically more realistic. He 
mentioned several names; inter alia, Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, and more recently Camerer and 
Loewenstein as the main critics against the mainstream economics that is a legacy of von 
Neumannesque formalization. Thus, a specific label attached to the new approach to economics is 
established, known as ‘behavioral economics’. 
This paper in turn will not move further to sink itself into the debate. Rather, given a more 
comprehensive review on contemporary economics and contemporary cognitive science, we will 
neither encourage a search of unified psychological theory of economic behavior nor a complete 
disbandment of previously established rationality assumption implemented well in many 
simulational approaches towards economic behavior. 
Firstly, we will examine the nature of contemporary rational assumptions of economic theory. 
This form of higher level cognition is very much complex to deal with in casual terms of more 
empirically-based methodologies standard in eliminativist programs such as psychophysical 
procedures, heuristic search, or vision detection, although such work has been initiated through the 
so-called neuroeconomic programs (Camerer, 2003). At its main core, rational formalization of 
economic agency will still hold at least for these two reasons: 
1.  It is mathematically representable with the help of its traditional formalization 
through game theory, decision theory, and other rule-based traditions (McFadden, 
1997). 
2.  It is open for bottom-up or cross-level1 explanations so its whereabouts can be 
more accessible, either domain-specifically or domain-generally. 
Secondly, we will give a report on how mainstream economics is deeply involved with folk-
theoretical assumptions. This report will be subsequently parallel with domain specificity that is apt 
to receive wider insights from general programs of cognitive science, and in many parts, detached 
from domain-general stance that is found to be more difficult to reconcile with the multi-level 
complexities of cognition itself. 
Finally, we will propose some insights we borrowed from modularity theory to which economic 
agency should be assigned, hence it gains the proper level of explanations and eventually, more 
explanatory power concerning the multidimensionality and uncertainty of human behavior.  
 
                                                 
1 This term is in accordance to second-order cyberneticians’ standpoint that does not tend to describe 
complex systems in mere hierarchical levels to allow fractal-like similarity emerge out of scale measurement, 
but instead, emphasize much on the role of rather arbitrary (or bottstrapping) interpretive systems of thought 
to observe emergent and self-organizing phenomena without explicit reference to scale measurement 
(Heylyghen, 1997; Rocha; 1997).  3
2. BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
Herb Simon indicates a significant distance between psychological knowledge and economic theory 
in his preliminary criticism on rational choice theory (Simon, 1955). The distance seems to remain 
still.  
Being rational, according to early rational choice theory, is to maximize the values of pay-off V 
of specific strategies S  that is causally brought by perceived particular behaviors A. Simplest 
strategy to attain such maximization is maximin rule as follows: 
() () s V a V
S s A a ∈ ∈
∧
= min max  
that is easily representable in strategic formalization such as game-theoretic models.  
 
 
Figure 1. Basic structure of a human economic agent (McFadden, 1999). 
This formalization leads to easier-to-measure empirical bases, if the theory only intend to explain 
the behaviors of agents in a well-defined market with very restricted alternatives. But how well-
defined a market or an economic transaction depends on how complete and effective the 
information about the environment, how powerful the agent is able to reason or compute her 
strategy, and how she learns from abstract reasoning and experience from time to time. In general, 
the traditional concept of rationality should be bounded. 
Elaboration will eventually come up with these viewpoints: 
-  through what channel the information is gathered. 
-  through what mechanism or process the information is capable to generate particular 
perceived and executed behaviors; and 
-  how this mechanism or process improves by learning or declines by fatigue and aging. 
In short, reckoning the complexity of environment, sensation and perception, central nervous 
system, proprioception and kinesthesia then back to the environment, as depicted in figure 1, we 
can depart from questions of how a specific perception can lead to recognized A* ⊂ A, how the 
reason comes up with every possible s ∈ S, how corresponding values of V(s) are calculated, and 
how a recognized or perceived a ∈ A*  is executed. 
2.1. KT-man 
Based on previous formalization of rationality, seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky  (1979) 
captures the empirical facts on many economic phenomena into the so called ‘prospect theory’.  4
Instead of relying the strategies of each agent on maximin or probabilistic solution, KT-man 
inherently has a unique deviation called marginal sensitivity. Traditionally, pay-off value is 
considered to be expected value for assumed continuous probability distribution Pa(s) that in turns 
will give mixed strategies as follows  () ( ) ) ( max
^
s P s V a V a a A a∈ = . 
But this is not always the case. 
In prospect theory the expected pay-offs are valued by P*aV(sa-r), where P* is a function which 
weights probabilities nonlinearly, overweighting probabilities below some value or so and 
underweighting larger one. The value function V(sa-r) exhibits diminishing marginal sensitivity to 
deviations from the reference point r, and an effect of reflection appears. The expected pay-off 
value can now be convex for losses [ V(sa - r) > 0 for s < r] and concave for gains [V(sa - r) < 0 for s 
> r]. 
In finance, prospect theoretical phenomenon appears in the problem called ‘the equity premium’ 
(Camerer, 1998), as a result of comparison of returns of stocks and bonds. In ‘normal’ stock 
markets, average return of stock is much higher than bond, giving a way to measure risk for 
investors. According to mainstream economics, investors must be extremely risk-averse in order to 
gain such high premium of stock market, but they usually do not. Instead of taking a certain return 
from bonds, investors tend to engage in riskier choice, expecting higher return from stocks 
regardless the fact that people are easier to lose money in stocks. The assumptions from expected 
utility theory do not hold. 
This risk-seeking behavior is not necessarily irrational but it is important for analysts to recognize 
the asymmetry of human choices (Bernstein, 1996). There is perfect channel of information, but in 
turn it will lead to completely complex procedures to determine perceived and executed behaviors. 
As a result, KT-man is not a general framework compared to rational choice formulation. Instead, 
it performs some ad hoc models to capture many peculiarities in people’s economic behavior. 
Therefore we argue that there must be a lower level explanation of economic rationality instead of 
merely behavioral analysis. 
2.2. GP-man 
Genetic programming (GP) has been an influential paradigm in modeling decision-making 
mechanism since the birth of bioinformatics. Its application to decision theory is an inspiration 
from its great success in explaining many biological phenomena. 
A proponent of this approach is Edmonds (1998) who evolutionary characterizes an economic 
agent according to these following main principles: 
-  Represent the agent by a whole evolving population of genes corresponding to one of its 
alternative models 
-  Populations of agents are thus modelled as populations of evolving populations 
-  Base the fitness function on either its error in modeling known past data or the utility the 
agent would have gained in the past if she has used this model but also with other factors 
such as the size of model and its predictivity 
-  Restrict the variation operators so towards an exploitative learning process (generalization, 
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-  Give the agent limited inferential ability to use its best model to choose its action. 
In short, too many background assumptions (evolutionary change of human cognition, 
inferential ability, calculation of fitness function) involved in this general and macro model as 













Figure 2. Basic Structure of a Simplified Economic Agent (Edmonds, 1998). 
The criticisms soon appear concerning those background assumptions. In our opinion, 
Darwinian evolution really has a possibility in neurological development, e.g.: neural darwinism 
(Edelman, Tononi, 2000). But once a specific abstract reasoning contained in cognition, viz. 
economic rationality, even if it involves many agents in entire population, the mechanism, at least in 
higher level cognition does not follow simple random mutation and environmental selection. As 
Dennett (1995) puts it in his attack on meme (a.k.a. evolutionary entity of cognition), what is 
preserved and transmitted in cultural, hence including economic evolution is information – in a 
media-neutral, language-neutral sense.  
Subsequently Dennett adds that such mutation Edmonds tries to apply in his rational model may 
be directed by purposeful human decision-making among competing cultural alternatives, rather 
than being simply random choices as expected by Darwinian theory. This is one of the 
interpretations of what Lamarkianism means, with all of its negative connotations that in turn, will 
not perform a biological evolutionary mechanism at all. 
Hereby a notion of GP-man as an homo economicus seems to lose the appropriate meaning of 
metaphor between biological and rational change. 
No matter how far the background assumptions are taken to, the general formalization of 
economic agency does not leave von Neumann’s basic model. And in more general form – that is, 
not restricted on economic rationality but in every aspect of human reasoning or human’s theory of 
mind in anticipating each other – this includes another field of cognitive science researches and 
disputes known as folk psychology. 
 
3. FOLK  PSYCHOLOGY 
Many behavioral analyses give much concern on simple stimulus-response mechanism along with 
its modifications. In addition, parallel with the basic idea of domain specificity, early formalization  6
of rationality gains its cognitive background assumption from the so-called ‘folk psychology’ or the 
common understanding of mental states (Goldman, 1993), usually deals much with desires, beliefs, 
preferences, and many other terms that are very closely related to formalization of rationality. 
There is some proposition from eliminativist (Churchland, 1980) that the term is just like 
phlogiston or caloric fluid, that it will eventually disappear along with lower level advancement in 
cognitive science. This is just the case when we observe through the looking glass of 
neuroeconomic programs. 
Regardless the facts that such eliminativism can lead to wrong framework – since there is no 
exact way to relate economic behavior to action potentials of neurons studied by psychophysics 
(Edelman, Tononi, 2000) – to be honest, the idea of folk psychology was derived from 
philosophical assumptions, or very higher level explanation of cognition that sometimes loses its 
connection with biological realism. For example, von Erckhardt (1994) considers folk psychology 
to consist, at a minimum, of (a) a set of attributive, explanatory and predictive practices, and (b) a 
set of notions or concepts used in those practices; very much close to the primitive terms required 
by rationality formalization. 
In turn, folk psychological states can be a way of trying to make sense of what is going on in the 
black box of other people's minds (Bermúdez, 2003). Analog to what has been going on in particle 
physics, beliefs and desires are explanatory constituents very much similar to observable behavior 
in, say, subatomic particles that are postulated to make sense of observable effects.  
Further, looking at folk psychology is dealing with two dominant approaches: theory-theory, as 
opposed to simulation-theory.  
 
3.1. Theory-Theory  
In theory-theory paradigm, some sort of ‘knowledge structure’ – typically a body of rules or 
principles or propositions – serves to guide the execution of the capacity to be explained. These 
rules or principles or propositions are often described as the agent’s ‘theory’ of the domain in 
question (Stich, Nichols, 1992).  
In some cases, the theory may be partially accessible to consciousness; the agent can tell us some 
of the rules or principles he is using. More often, however, the agent has no conscious access to the 
knowledge guiding his behavior. In short, she does not know that she knows. The theory is ‘tacit’, 
following the earlier findings of Chomsky, Fodor, and many others who attach themselves in 
modularity programs (see section 4). 
In details, a body of knowledge is theory-like if it has (1) an interconnected (‘coherent’) set of 
concepts, (2) a distinctive set of ontological commitments, and (3) a causal-explanatory network.  
In many ways, such paradigm can explain many things – we ourselves are in such theory if such 
theory exists at all. As children get older – folk psychology deals much with language acquisition of 
infants along with its pathologies such autism – they master more and more of the principles of 
folk psychology, gain more theories. What is so unsatisfactory of this stance is how those 
knowledge structures can be assembled from tinier pieces because taking beliefs and desires as 
atomic constituents will lead to infinite possibilities, and again, ad hoc solutions as Stich and Nichols 
(1992) themselves puts it:  7
“By itself, of course, the theory-theory would not enable us to predict the data, since the theory-theory 
does not tell us anything about the order in which the principles of folk psychology are acquired.” 
 
3.2. Simulation-Theory  
In this paradigm, using some pretense mechanism, knowledge structure of folk psychology is 
acquired through some off-line simulation. 
The notions are clear, especially against the theory-theory paradigm: that there is no such tacit 
theory, no evidence to support the suggestion that we have such knowledge and some evidence to 
suppose that we do not. It is more likely, say simulationists, that these abilities are simply 
encouraged by the ‘innate capacity to simulate others’. 
 
Figure 3. Folk-theoretical diagrams in which both simulational and tacit theory are represented. See 
Figure 1 and 2 to see parallelism between formalization of economic rationality and folk-psychology 
(Stich, Nichols, 1992). 
All versions of the simulation theory have something in common, that is when we predict the 
behavior of another person, or of ourselves far in the future, the mechanism which governs the 
daily interaction of our beliefs and desires, the practical-reasoning mechanism, is disengaged from 
its actual inputs, or to put it bluntly, from external stimuli and from our own salient beliefs and 
desires. At the same time, this mechanism is disconnected from the action controllers, the mental 
mechanisms responsible for a decision-to-behave being translated into actual behavior (Arkway, 
2003).  
Operating ‘off-line’ in this term, is that the decision-making mechanism is fed pretend-input in 
the form of those beliefs and desires we ‘imagine’ we would experience ourselves if we were in the 
same situation of the person whose behavior we are about to predict. The practical reasoning 
mechanism then processes these pretend inputs and a pretend decision-to-behave is generated. This 
pretend decision-to-behave is transformed into the prediction of behavior.    8
Simulationists are not explicit about the kind of explanations produced by simulation. Since the 
simulation theory is founded on the premise that there is no body of internally represented 
commonsense psychological knowledge, and consequently no laws in which it is represented, 
appealing to the covering law model the same way tacit theorists do is not a gateway into 
explanation.  
What simulation needs to do is a causal account of folk psychological explanation whose 
satisfaction conditions either involve simulation essentially or, if not, at least compatible with 




What seems to disappear from folk-psychological assumptions is the absence of the clarity of the 
so-called postulated subatomic particles of folk psychology, i.e.: beliefs and desires. 
Either tacit or simulational, both departed from the same source, the notion of modularity, that 
the mind is made up of genetically specified, independently functioning ‘modules’ (Fodor, 1983). 
Unlike beliefs or desires, the modules are considered to be hardwired (not assembled from more 
primitive processes), of fixed neural architecture (genetically specified), domain-specific (a module 
computes a constrained class of specific inputs bottom-up, focusing on entities relevant only to its 
particular processing capacities), fast, autonomous, mandatory (a module’s processing is set in 
motion whenever relevant data present themselves), automatic, stimulus-driven, and insensitive to 
central cognitive goals.  
A further characteristic of modules is that they are informationally encapsulated. In other words, 
other parts of the mind can neither influence nor have access to the internal workings of a module, 
only to its outputs. Modules only have access to information from stages of processing at lower 
levels, not from top-down processes (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 
The bottom-up processes here can give us a possibility to build more elementary viewpoints 
differed from beliefs and desires. 
 
4.1. Modules 
Speaking of modules practically means referring to mental structures or components of the mind 
that can be invoked in order to explain various cognitive capacities.  
Very roughly, this means that modules are dedicated to solving restricted classes of problems in 
unique domains (Samuels, Stich, Tremoulet, 1998), highly related to two fundamentally different 
sorts of mental structure: (i) sometimes it is used to refer to systems of mental representations 
following those works of Chomsky on generative grammar; (ii) on other side the term is used in 
order to talk about computational mechanisms that is deemed to be classical architecture of 
cognition as those of Newell and Simon.  
 For instance, the claim that there is a vision module implies that there are mental structures 
which are brought into play in the domain of visual processing and are not recruited in dealing with 
other cognitive tasks (Pylyshyn, 1999).   9
But soon, such specific modules are found to be dilemmatic, for instance, Pylyshyn’s 
impenetrability of visual processing in terms of the so-called ‘early vision’ (Marr, 1982) is so vague 
whenever one wants to determine its limitation. This seems to be the same case of Fodor’s 
peripheral modularity. Input systems (those responsible for perception and language processing) 
and output systems (those responsible for action) are plausible candidates for modularity, but not 
‘central systems’ (those systems responsible for reasoning and belief fixation). 
Steven Pinker, has suggested that not only are there modules for perception, language and 
action, but there may also be modules for many tasks traditionally classified as central processes. 
Apparently, instead of seeing it as peripheral modules, based on biological evidences, Pinker 
certainly sees many modules appear in central system – or central nervous system shaped by 
evolution – including intuitive mechanics: knowledge of the motions, forces, and deformations that 
objects undergo; intuitive biology: understanding how plants and animals work; intuitive 
psychology: predicting other people's behavior from their beliefs and desires; and the self-concept: 
gathering and organizing information about one's value to other people, and packaging it for others  
(Pinker, 1994). We can see clearly that Pinker’s such modules are found to be ubiquitously 
implemented in folk psychology, albeit the difficulties to find more elementary conditions. At least 
through this stance, bottom-up processes are more plausible. 
It is not yet decidable, if at all, which paradigm is going to take the lead, or we should wait for 
another turn of Kuhnian scientific revolution that allows one of those two sides dead. But 
implementatively, the notion of modules can give us way to construct plausible cognitive 
computational architecture, especially for the purpose of explaining economic rationality. 
 
4.2. Cognitive Architecture 
Finding an implementative way according to the modularity theories is dealing with another bigger 
battle, which is between domain specificity that has been the entire background assumption of this 
paper, and domain generality that does not allow cognition to be separated into many seemingly 
independent constituents.  
But as Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) brightly noted – despite their difficulties to find appropriate 
ways to ‘separate’ modules – that we can assemble two major stream of cognitive architecture into 
one single paradigm.  
Since the development of the first artificial neural network, the idea of distributed processing 
enjoyed a victory in the battle against its symbolic and serial counterpart. In defense of 
connectionism or distributed processing, Elman and Bates say that no one really understands the 
limits and capabilities of non-linear dynamical systems that are allowed to happen by connectionist 
architecture; but perhaps, someday it will be established, and therefore parallel distributed 
processing is no complete scientific humdrums or even wrong scientific enterprise (Elman, Bates, 
1993). 
Probably, the best way to resolve the unknown limitation of connectionist architecture is to 
accept Fodor and Pylyshyn’s suggestion to put some restraints to connectionist architecture, to put 
it as an implementative method for ‘classical’ or symbolic requirements. From neuroscientific and 
psychological viewpoints concerning the nature of consciousness, this ‘classical’ argument finds its  10
very strong supports (Edelman, Tononi, 2000; James, 1890; Searle, 1980; Simon, 1955), although 
for some reason, such arguments cannot cover the computational model it encourages such as how 
really the brain works. 
 
4.3. Early Efforts 
Neural networks that learn only one task can have simple architectures and may not need 
modularity. However, real organisms generally have not one task but many different tasks to 
accomplish in order to survive and reproduce. Hence, their nervous systems tend to be organized 
with anatomically and functionally distinct modules. 
In biological reality it is the nature that creates network architectures. Hence, it might be 
interesting to study how modular network architectures may spontaneously arise as part of a 
process of development in individual networks or evolution in a population of networks. 
Unfortunately, such attempts has been developed for very limited purposes: identity and spatial 
locations (Di Ferdinando, Calabretta, Parisi, 2000), syntactic acquisition (Smolensky, Legendre, 
Miyata, 1992); although in turn, there is much hope to construct architecture with wider range of 
purposes. Apart from traditional connectionism, modularity theory is merely serial computing. But 
if the computing is embedded in a cognitive architecture (partially built, consisting of modules; 
entirely built, artificial intelligence), then it must adopt serial computing mechanism of any kinds. 
Apt to the problem of rationality in economics, what becomes a necessity is an attempt to 
construct partial building, i.e.: Pinker’s intuitive (or commonsense or folk) psychology, and self-
concept, based on his descriptive and elaborated work on language acquisition. Rationality thus is 
not merely a problem of syntax, but it requires much advancement on semantic acquisition and 
operation, especially in those fields implicitly involved with decision making, e.g.: effects of the 
media to financial market vaguely indicated by Schuster (2003) as follows: 
“In principle, however, there is the possibility that the media, due to their function of 
generating selective awareness and selective behavior, induce and reinforce specific market 
reactions which develop into dynamic interactions afterwards.” 
In many ways, there is no way to explain this dynamic interaction other than using a modular 
approach in which human linguistic and perceptional capacities can be grasped proportionally. 
This is not an easy – if not speculative at all – thing to do. But some ‘evidences from the field’ of 
Camerer and some implicit processes of economic decision-making, may give a direct implication a 
border between economics and psychology seems clearer, if only there were such well-defined 
border in this highly complex and adaptive economic system. 
Economic agents bring to their actions not just their preferences and 
endowments, but also their understanding…. In many of the small, 
standard problems of economics, we can ignore this. In the larger issues 
of development and reconstruction, and in constructing an economics 
for problems of complication and ill-definition, we cannot. We need to 
take cognition seriously (Arthur, 2000). 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper gives a touchstone to which the next research on cognitive mechanism underlying 
decision making of Homo sapiens should be directed.  11
We give a short description showing that both contemporary theory of economic agency and 
folk-psychological perspective on cognitive science are on the same side, in terms that they speak in 
the same language, same terms, hence, same level of description where only generality that differs. 
Further, we do not attempt to take the debate between tacit theory and off-line simulation very 
seriously in this paper, unless, as we expect in the future, the difference between both paradigms 
can generate a unique consequence from each of them. We only emphasize that folk psychology is 
an emergent properties of bottom-up processes that occur in the level of modules. 
Albeit the complications and debates, modularity theory as a theory of meso-level cognition – 
based on biological evidences, it is assumedly related to the development of neuron throughout 
nervous system in infant; based on the contemporary folk psychology, modularity implemented 
through connectionist architecture can capture human linguistic capabilities – is not only a theory 
bridging the gap. Instead, we believe, it is a way to move deeper into the black box, untangle it in 
such a way so there is no reason for economists to be an outsider looking in at the cognitive 
mechanism as behaviorists do it. 
This standpoint gives us a chance to explore this possibility further in more technical way, 
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untuk pengutipan, dapat dilakukan tanpa izin tertulis dari BFI namun harus 
menyebutkan dengan baik sumber kutipan, meliputi nama penulis, nomor seri 
dokumen, penerbit BFI Press, dan tahun penerbitan sesuai dengan standar 
penulisan bibliografi di mana kutipan dilakukan. 
•  Hard-Copy dari dokumen ini dapat diperoleh dengan permintaan tertulis 
kepada Kantor Administrasi BFI pada alamat di bawah. Hard-Copy dapat 
diperoleh dengan membayar uang pengganti cetak dokumen. Hard-Copy 
dapat diperbanyak, didistribusikan, ataupun dikutip untuk penggunaan non-
komersil, pengayaan riset ilmiah, dan keperluan pendidikan tanpa perlu 
meminta izin tertulis dari BFI.  Khusus untuk pengutipan, dapat dilakukan 
tanpa izin tertulis dari BFI namun harus menyebutkan dengan baik sumber 
kutipan, meliputi nama penulis, nomor seri dokumen, penerbit BFI Press, dan 
tahun penerbitan sesuai dengan standar penulisan bibliografi di mana kutipan 
dilakukan.  
 
Pelanggaran terhadap ketentuan-ketentuan tersebut di atas adalah pelanggaran 
hukum dan mendapat ancaman hukuman/sanksi sesuai peraturan perundangan 
yang  berlaku di Indonesia Hal-hal di luar petunjuk yang diatur di sini harus 
dikonsultasikan terlebih dahulu ke Kantor Administrasi BFI dengan alamat: 
 
BANDUNG FE INSTITUTE 
Jl. Cemara 63 Bandung 40161 
JAWA BARAT – INDONESIA 
URL: http://www.bandungfe.scripterz.org 
Mail: bandungfe@yahoo.com 
Ph. +62 22 2038628 
Ponsel: +62 818438435 a.n. Rio Siagian 
 